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Case No.
12697

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory relief action brought by
the plaintiff, State Farm, to have determined whether there was coverage to one of the defendant.s,
Tsosie B. Yazzie, at the time of an accident which
occurred October 3, 1970, and under an automobile
liability policy issued by State Farm to defendants
Jack B. and Roma K. Holt.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Both plaintiff and all of the defendants who
were represented by counsel moved for summary
judgment in the lower court. The District Court of
Iron County, by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns,
granted the defendants' .Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Motion of the plaintiff thereby
drtcrmining that plaintiff State Farm's policy did
cm·e1· defendant Tsosie B. Yazzie at the time of the
aC"eident of October 3, 1970.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The phintiff and appellant, State Farm, seeks
a ren:irsal of the summary Judgment ente1·ed against
it by the trial court and further seeks to have this
court enter a Summary Judgment in its favor detel'lnining that there 'vas no coverage as to defendant Tsosir B. Yazzie at the time of the October 3,
1970 accident.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During April of 1970, defendants Jack B. Holt
and Roma K. Holt, his wife, purchased a 1963 Chevrolet 4-<loor station \vagon. At that time and up to
the presPnt time the Holts have resided on a farm
in Enterprise, \Vashington County, Utah. At approximately the same time the Holts purchased this 1963
Chev, they also took out upon it an automobile liability policy with plaintiff, State Farm, (Affidavit
of Jack B. Holt, para. 2 and 3). A copy of the State
Farm policy in question is attached to the Affidavit
of A. F. Smith, and it is undisputed that said policy
2

had been issued to the Holts and would lrnYe been in
force at the time of the accident in question of October :i, 1970, PXCPpt for the reasons hereafter urged
by State Farm in this b1·ief. That is, there is no disputP but that a premium had been paid by the Holts
and the policy 1ieriod extended through the date of
the October :ird accident. The dispute concerns only
whether defendant Tsosie B. Yazzie, after having
purchased the vehicle, was covered.
The coverages available under the State Farm
Policy and insofar as applicable here i n c l u de d
$10,000/$20,000 for liability for bodily injury and
$10,000 for liability for property damage. At the
time of the October 3, 1970 accident, the vehicle involved other than the 1963 Chev was a Plymouth
automobile covered by an automobile liability policy
issued by U.S.F.&G. which included $10,000/$20,000
bodily injury coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of that policy. This coverage could become involved since Tsosie B. Yazzie was uninsured
if he had no coverage under the State Farm policy
(Reporter's transcript, page 3). U.S.F.&G. has hired counsel to represent defendants Robert A. Rowley, Sr., Robert A. Rowley, Jr., Earl T. Jones, Kent
Pendleton and Mrs. Kent Pendleton in this lawsuit.
At the hearing before the trial court, defendants'
counsel objected to the disclosure of U.S.F.&G.'s involvement as being immaterial. \\'hile this may be
so from a technical standpoint, State Farm's counsel
considers it is pertinent for this court to know that
3

the same bodily injury cm·eragc is aYailable to the
occupants of the Rowley \·ehicle and n•g-ardless of
how the court rules in this case.
Prior to the Octobrr :i, Hno accident, defendant
Tsosie B. Yazzir \Vas employed doing farm \vork for
defendant .Jack B. Holt. On either September 22nd
or 23, 1070 (Holt was not certain as to the rxact
date) .J ark B. Holt for himself and his wife sold to
Yazzie the 196:3 Chr\·. The agreed upon purchase
price was $2i10. Yazzie paid nothing clown and he
arnl Holt ag-rcl'd that a p01"tion of Yazzie's '''ages
thri·e:-tfter earned would be c1·editecl toward the purchase price until the ful $250 had been paid. Between
the date of salt• nn Septembrl' 22nd 01· 23rd and the
accident <late of (ktober :-3, 1970, Holt credited Yazzie
with $150 frt)l11 his wages tDward the purchase price
and therefore, and as of October 3, 1970, there was
an unpai<l balance of $100 clue the Holts from Yazzie
on the ca1· (Affi(hffit of Jack B. Holt, para. 5).
Thr agreement between Yazzie and the Holts
was oral. At the time of the accident of October 3,
1970, the 1963 Chev was still registered and titled in
the names of.Jack B. and Roma K. Holt. The only reason the registration and title had not been transferred was because the Holts were retaining these as a
basis to insure full payment of the purchase price.
However, Holt and Yazzie had agreed that all ownership in the ,·ehicle was transferred to Yazzie at the
time of the September 22nd or 23, 1970 sale ( Affidavit of Jack B. Holt, para.6).
4

Upon the September 22nd or 23rd sale, all possession and control of the \·chicle passed to Yazzie
who had this exclusin•ly from then up to and including the Octobe1· 1970 accident. Following the sale,
Holt neither knew nor directed what use was made of
thr vehicle except as he may have learned of if incidf'ntally and since Yazzie did during this period continue to work for him (Affidavit of Jack B. Holt,
para. 7.) Defendants' counsel submitted to the trial
court an Affidavit from Gaylen Heppler, an insurance adjuster for U.S.F.&G., and which had attached
to it a statement signed by Jack B. Holt and taken
by Heppler on October 6, 1970. Presumably, this Affidavit was offered to impeach Holt's Affidavit and
particulal'ly his claim that all use and possession of
the car was in Yazzie following the sale. This appears to be based on the portion of the statement
written by Heppler and signed by Holt wherein it
states: "I have not used the car since that time [i.e.
the sale] other than to drive it around out in the
fields." Both Mr. and Mrs. Holt were present in
court at the hearing on the parties' Motions for Summary .Judgment and were prepared to testify in clarification of this portion of Mr. Holt's statement although this was not done because both counsel stipulated as to what Mr. Holt would have testified had
he been called. (For some reason the reporter failed
to report this stipulation, and it is not included in
his transcript). On the question of his use of the
1968 Chev after the sale, the parties stipulated that
Holt would have testified that he never drove the
5

Chev himself thereafter although he did ride in the
ca1· 011 one and possibly two occasions when Yazzie
drm·c from one part of the farm to another. It was
this use that Holt was refen·ing to when he allowed
Heppler to include in the statement that he used it
"to drive it around out in the fields." In the Hc>ppler
stat0111ent, l\lr. Holt states in the sentence just preceeding the l'nP ciuote<l abovP that "Mr. Yazzie has
full usP uf tlw 19G8 Che\· Stationwagon since we
1
H.'. ,Teed to the salC'." Mr. Holt re-affinns this point
i:1 his :\ffidavit which, of course, was given under
oa+h. If there
ambiguity ntised by the Heppler
tement, it should be noted that it, unlike the Affida':it. was unsworn. Moreover. Holt's offer of furthr'r swm·n tf'stimnny to the effect noted above should
tlw ambiguity, if one exists. Defendants' counsd may also attack the Holt Affidavit as
ha Ying been clrafterl by State Farm's counsel ( "·hich
it was and aftf'r full consultation and agreement of
Mr. Holt) and as containinr" ccrtnin conclusorv
. statemrnts. The fact remains that its allegations ai·e made
Holt undC'r oath and based on his personal knowledge. If clefondants' counsel objf'cted to its allegations. cnnclusory or otherwise, he was free to take
Hnlts' rlrposi ti on or produce other testimony or affits to refute it.
On Saturday, October 3, 1970, at approximately
10:10 p.m .. Yazzie was driving the 1963 Chev when
it collided with a Plymouth automobile near 200
North on Center Street m Enterprise, Utah. This
6

Plymouth automobile was owned by defendant Robert A. Rowley, Sr. It was being driven at the time
of the accident by defendant Earl T. Jones and carried as passengers Robert A. Rowley, Jr., and Cindy
Pendleton. The latter was killed in the accident and
slw was the daughter of defendants Kent Pendleton
and Mrs. Kent Pendleton. The other defendants besides Yazzie and the Holts were passengers in Yazzie's 1963 Chev and neither they nor Yazzie and the
Holts have entered any appearance in this action
either personally or th1·ough an attorney (Plaintiff's
Complaint, Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim
and other pleadings in the file).
Jack B. Holt had no specific knowledge on the
day of the accident and prior thereto of Y azzie's activities or whereabouts except around noon of that
day Yazzie had told Holt he was going to Cedar City,
Utah from Enterprise on some personal business of
his own. At the time of the accident, Yazzie was not
driving on any mission or errand for Holt and Yazzie
was not at that time controlled by or subject to the
control of Holt (Affidavit of Jack B. Holt, para. 8).
Between the date of the sale and the accident,
the Holts neither transferred nor attempted to transfer to Yazzie any interest they had in the State Farm
policy and State Farm and its representatives were
never notified concerning the sale until after the accident. Neither Holt nor his wife is related to Yazzie
and Yazzie has never been a resident of the household
7

of either of the Holts (AfficlaYit of Jack B. Holt,

para. 9, 19 and 11).

ARGUMENT
POJXT I.
BY P..EASO:\ OF TIIE SALE AGREEl\IENT,
YAZZIE \\'AS lJSI:\G TIIE \'EHICLE AT THE
Tll\IE OF TIIE ACCIDENT AS THE O\\'NER
\\'AS :\OT t:SJNG IT \\'ITH THE PERl\JISSION OF THE IIOLTS. THEREFORE, HE
IS XOT COVEHED AS AN INSURED BY THE
STA. TE FARM POLICY.

A. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE
FAR:\J POLICY DOES NOT AFFORD YAZZIE COYEH.\GE AS OF THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDF:-\T.
State Farm's obligation to the Holts, Yazzie and
to any third persons must arise from the terms of
State Farm's automobile liability policy issued to the
Holts. In applicable part, these prm'isions are as follows:
SECTJON I - LIABILITY AND MEDICAL
PAYMENTS INSURING AGREEMENTS.
COYETIAGE A- BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
• * * * *
To pay on behalf of the insw·cd all sums which
the insured shall beeome legally obligated to
pay as damages because of (emphasis aclrlecl)
(A) bodily injury sustained by other persons, * * *

* * * * *

caused by accident arising out of the owner8

ship, mai.ntl'nanee 01· usP, including loadirnz
or unload mg, of tlw ownPd motor vehicle· • • •
(The foregoing is quoted from page 3
the
policy)
* * * * *
DEFINITIONS - SECTION I
* * * * *
Insured - the unqualified word 'insured' includes
( 1) the named insurrd, and
( 2) if the named insured is a person or
persons! also includes his or their spouse ( s),
if a resident of the same household, and
( 3) if residents of the same household,
the relatives of the first person named in the
declarations, or if his spouse, and
( 4) any other person while usin_g the
owned motor vehicle, PROVIDED THE OPERATION AND THE ACTUAL USE OF
SUCH VEHICLE ARE \VITH THE PERMISSION OF THE NAMED INSURED OR
SUCH SPOUSE AND ARE \VITHIN THE
SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION • • •
(The fore going is quoted from page 5 of the
policy)
Simply stated, the State Farm policy affords
coverage to Yazzie if at the time of the accident he
was driving with the permission of either Mr. or Mrs.
Holt, they being the named insureds. If he was and
if he was drh'ing the vehicle within the scope of such
permission, he would be an "insured" under the socalled "omnibus clause" quoted above from the policy,
(this being paragraph ( 4) under Definition of In9

sured). If he was not, then there is no basis under

the policy for State Farm's being responsible for Yazzip's conduct as it relates to the accident in question.

At the time of the accident, Yazzie was not driving thl' n·hide "with the permission" of the Holts
si,1ce tlw fact is that at that time he was driving as
the ownr1· of the 19G3 Chev. As the owner, hr did not
nrecl nor did he obtain permission from the Holts to
b(' di·i,·ing the ,·chicle at any time after the sale inat the time the accident occmTed. All beneficial inten'st in the vehicle hc:i.d been transferred to
Y'. 1 zzic sonw ten clays before and afte1· that time, the
Eolts
no control or rip:ht of c:ontnil oH'l' wh;i1 use
Yazzie 111adP of the ,·ehicle. It would be a misst:itement to say that Y
was ch·iving \vi th "pen11issinn" at the time nf the accident since it is clear the
Holts hacl no permission to .r;i'.·e or withhold.

R THER'": _\_TIE NO PT AH CASES
SQUARELY IN PO TNT TO 'T'HTS C:'\ SE.
HOY.EYER, THERE ATIE FTAH CASES
\\'TTTCR HOLD TT-T .:\T .\ TTI:' NSFFREE
HAY DECfV. TF,
N" 0 1 1 •· N f.' P r-vr.N
TROUGH TFERF. F \S NO'T'
f'PTL
J_\
\\'T'T'E "i'TT:' 'T'T'_'. l\J('f'r'R
OF TTTL r.: ;\ Nn r T'GTSTJL\ TTON PT?OVTOF TLTE UT,\P J\IOTOR VEHICLE

ACT.
The defernfants contended before the District
Court and will contend befo1·e this court that Yanie's
use was a pennissive use and not the use of an mvner
because at the time of the accident the statutory requirements relating to transfer of title and regis10

tration as between the Holts and Yazzie had not been
completed. Defendants will undoubtedly cite the statutes ( 41-1-62 et. seq. U.C.A., 1953) which they will
contend prevented Yazzie from becoming an owner
bPcause the Department had not yet issued new title
ancl registration to Yazzie ( 41-1-72 U.C.A., 1953)
no1· had the Holts endorsed and df'livered their title
and registration to him ( 41-1-77 U.C.A., 1953) even
though possession of the vehicle had been delivered to
him. This argument will continue that since he was
not an "owner" and since the Holts had put him in
possession of the vehicle some ten days before, he was
driving the vehicle with their permission and within
the scope of their permission at the time of the accident even though the undisputed facts are that the
Holts knew nothing about the specific use Yazzie intended to make of the 1963 Chev on the date of the
accident, other than that he was going into Cedar
City on a mission of his own.
From time to time in this brief various sections
of Article 4 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act ( 41-1-62
et. seq. U.C.A., 1953) will be referred to or quoted.
Insofar as pertinent to the issues before the court in
this case, these sections of the statute have remained
materially unchanged since 1935 when they were
first enacted and since prior to the decisions of this
court in each of the Utah cases hereafter cited.
There are several Utah cases somewhat in point
to the instant case and which have interpreted these
sections of the statutes. It is clear from these cases
11

that a tr an sf eree may become the owner of a vehicle
as between himself and the transferor even though
neither title nor registration has been issued or deli,·ered to him and that compliance with these sections is not absolute and mandatory to pass ownership in all cases.
Probably tlw leading Utah case dealing with this
1n·oblem is Jnd·son v. James, 97 U. 41, 89 P.2d 235
( 1!1:19). That rase involved a dispute as to ownership of an automobile as between the children of T.
F. Jackson through his defendant administrator and
plaintiff. a "·onwn \Vhom J arkson had purportedly
ma1TiNl
lwforc his death. At the time of the
marriage crremony, Jackson's divorce was not yet
final and so the marriage had, in fact, been a nullity.
Plaintiff claimrd, ancl the jury in the trial court
foun<l, that .Tarkson had made a \\·eclding gift of the
automobile to plaintiff although no title or registration was e\·er transf r»red to her prior to Jackson's
death. Therefore, and basccl on some of the same sections of the statutr as are involved in the instant case,
.T
sons by a prior marriage claimed that the
tr::rnsfrr ,,·as ineffective and that title did not pass
and ownership remained in the estate. In sustaining
the trial court's finding that title had passed to the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court stated at 97 U. pp. 45
and 46:
It seems therefm·e that Section 71 [comparable
to present day 41-1-72] is not to be construed,
as contended by appellant, as absolute and
mandatory to pass a title. In the light of the
12

cviclcn t tho t if.<.; provisions
1cc1·c l('l'iften to protcrt innocent p11rchnBers
and third parties from frn11d b11t u·as not intended to be co11 trolling <tB bet ween the parties
to the trcrn.saction. It may well be doubted that
the legislature could make mandatory any such
formalities as a prerequisite to transfer of title
as between the parties. (emphasis added)

whole chapter it

Another Utah case of some relevance is Dahl,
ct al. v. Prince, et nl, 119 U. 556, 230 P.2d 328
( 1!)51). This case involved a vehicle that was exchanged by one Garn and his wife to Dahl for another
vehicle. Thereafter, Dahl permitted the Garns temporarily to have possession back of the vehicle they
had exchanged. While it was in their possession, it
was attached by a creditor of the Garns'. At that
time the "Department" had not issued a title to Dahl
as appears to be required for title to transfer by
57-3(a)-72 U.C.A., 1943 (comparable to present day
41-1-72 U.C.A., 1953) which states that until the Department has issued the new registration and title,
that "ti tie thereto shall be deemed not to have passed
* * *." The Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court's finding that title had passed from the Garns
to Dahl and held that the equitable title to the car
passed to Dahl in consequence of the exchange agreemen t, nothwithstanding Dahl's failure to effectuate
a transfer of a certificate of title. The Supreme Court
in this case favorably cited Jackson, v. James, supra,
and then stated concerning the intent of the legislature in enacting this statute (present day 41-1-72
13

U.C.A., 195:i), the following at 119 U. pp. 661 and

562:

The statute in question was enaded to protect
innocent purdwsers, not to injure tlwm nor to
deprive them of their Pquities unde1· purchase
agree men ts.
The third Utah case of some relevance on this
issue is Stc1cart 1'. f'mnmcrcial Ins. f'o. of Glen Falls,
N.Y., 114 U. 278, 198 P.2d L167 (1948). On casual
reading it might appea1· that the Stewart case favors
the defendants' position in the instant case and detracts from tlw holding in Jackson , .. James. However, it is believed thnt the facts in the Stewart case
clearly distinguish it from both Jackson,.. James and
thr instant case.
The Stt•\,:art
i11\'oh'ed the collision co,·erage
unde1· thr ch,frndant. Cornmc1"C'ial Insurance Company's polic>·· The insured, Richards, had taken out
a one-year policy on his autornobilt> effecti,·e to December 20, 1945. On December 7, 1
he died inlem·ing six adult chikfren and the car as the
sole asset of the estate. On December 18, 194;), one
of the children in Salt Lak<> Cit>· accepted $400 from
one Spackman toward the purchase price of the car.
However, this was not definitely agreed upon as the
purchase price since Spackman was to drive the car
to Logan where the other heirs were to finalize the
purchase price and take the other steps necessary to
comply with the statutory requirements for transfer.
En i·out€ to Logan on December 18th the vehicle was
14

darnagNl bPyond PConomic repair. The defendant insuranct> company rrfused coverage because, and
among other reasons, the ownership had passed to
Spackman and the estat€ had no insurable intert>st
in tlw car at the time of the collision. On this issue
tlw insurance company based much of its argument
upon the case of Jackson vs. James, supra. The Supremt> Court noted that the Jackson case had held
title could pass without there being compliance with
all the statutory steps, but went on to state at 114
U. at p. 285:
\Vhile in that case it was held that title
could pass without having complied with all
the necessary statutory steps, the rule announced in that case is not controlling here.
This case presents a different factual picture
and there are other statutes of this state which
are involved in this litigation and which were
not involved in the decision of that case.
The other statute involved in the Stewart case
and which was not involved in the Jackson case was
57-3(a)-70, U.C.A., 1943 (comparabletopresentday
41-1-70, U.C.A., 1953). This section of the statute
provides a simplified manner in which a vehicle may
be transferred from a decedent to his heirs if under
the value of $1,000 (now $4,000) and if the appropriate affidavit is filed. The court noted that there
was no compliance with this section of the statutes
and no dealings by the buyer with five of the six
heirs. In fact, the court notes Spackman was told he
woukl have to complete the transaction by dealing
If)

with these other five heirs and such had not been done
at the time of the accident. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court said it was dealing with
only "a partially completed transaction" and "the
estate \Votdd
an insurable interest on the car
until such time as a completed sale was effectuated."
The Stewart case is distinguishable from the instant case and the Jackson , .. J arnes case in that in
each of the latter there is a fully completed transfer
of interest and possession by all those having an interest as owner to the respective transferees and all
that remainNl to be done was a completion and transfo1· of the documents referrecl to in th<' st:-itute. This
is f:-ir cliffo1·rnt fi·orn thr Ste\\':-trt case where one of
the kc>' tenns (i.e. price) had not been finally determined and whC' 'C' fj,·c of six owners had yet to signify thri1·
to the sale.
1

In contenrlin.g· that the l\fotrn· Yehiclr Act prc,·cnts Yazzie fnnn hm·ing· become an ownor in the inst:-int c:-ise, the defendants will p1·obahl;.· rd;.· on two
S'.'ction:'. (1 f t1 1 is Act \Yhich ;t1·r qliote(1 as follows:
.t 1-1-1:). N
JT lwfn1·r t1·;i11sfcT comnlete. - Until tlw del)nl'tment shall ha,·c issued suc 1 1 nn,· eC'1·tific:1 tc of rrg·istration and
certificatC' of mn1rrship, delin'l'>' of any ,·ehiclr required to be i·eg·istc1·cd shall he deernecl
not to
been made and title thereto shall
be deemed not to han• passed, and said intended transfer sha 11 be c1cemec1 to lw incomplete
and not to be ,·al id 01· effectin' for arff prn·posr
except as prm·ided in section 41-1-77.
16

Owner not liable for negligent
opcrat10n aftt>r transfer. - The owner of a
111otor vrhiclt' who has niadr a bona fide sale
or transfer of his titlr or interest and who has
dPli,·rrc'd possrssion of such vehicle and certificate of registration and the certificate of
title thPreto proprrly t'!Hlorsrd to the purchas<'l" or transfrn'r shall not hr liablt> for any
damages thPrcafter resulting from negligent
operation of such vehicle by another.
Srction 72 states that title to a \"t>hicle doesn't
pass, and the transferP<' therefon' does not become
the "owne1·" until the clepartmrnt has issurd these
spceificd clocunH'nts. Of coursr, Jr1<·kso11 l'. Jnmcs,
su1n·a, and Dnhl, ct nl. r. J>ri111·c, ct nl., supra, involved this section, and it is clear from those cas<'S that
as between the parties a transfrn'l' clops become the
mnwr d1'spitP non-compliancp with the apparent
mandate of that section.
72 alsn C'xprrssly
states that und<'l" othe1· circumstanees its prodsions
:ll'r
providing, in f•ffect. that transfr• s h:1ncl!P<1 in acconlancL' with section 77 are also
\"'.lbl to
OW11C'l'Ship.
it
appPal" that section 77 is
i111;Jortant to a drtrrrnination of the instant case.
T 11at st>d inn clo1's say that an own<'r who has sold and
dt-liYPrec1
of a ,·ehicle to a buyer is not
therc'afkr li0ble for its operation ancl provided the
has also properly emlorsrd and delh·ered to
thr
the registration ancl title. Although section
77 states it ncgatiYely it might be argued that the
implication from its wording is that an owner who
17

dosen't meet all these requirements at the time of
sale, as the Holts admittedly did not, still is liable for
the vehicle's negligent operation by another and hence
his liability insurance carrier is also.
The problem with this interpretation is that it
disregards the wording of section 77 and as it applies
to the facts of this case. The controversy here is whether Yazzie is or is not covered and is not whether the
Holts are. Obviously, the "owner" referred to in section 77 would be the Holts and not Yazzie and therefore any effect this section would have on the instant
case would be on the Holts' liability and not Yazzie's
since this section says nothing whatever about the
responsibility of the buyer. Section 77 does not say,
nor can it reasonably be implied from it, that if an
owner makes a sale of his car but doesn't comply with
all of the requirements of the section that his liability
insurance carrier will then be responsible for the
negligent operation of the vehicle by the buyer.
Section 77 state nothing about the circumstances
under which an owner-seller who has not complied
with all of its requirements might be liable to a third
party for the negligence of the operator-buyer. It
does not appear to enlarge the general law relating
· to the grounds on which the owner might be liable for
the negligent operation of his vehicle and presumably a third person, to recover against the ownerseller, would still have to prove a basis for vicarious
liability or else some independent negligence on the
part of the owner-seller. It is difficult to see how sec18

tion 77 applies w the instant case at all. On this appeal, plaintiff seeks only to be relieved from coverage
of Yazzie, the buyer. It is a separate matter having
nothing to do with this appeal if the defendants believt> that they havr some basis for recovery against
thP Holts, the owner, and that section 77 assists them
in that regard.
There are several other sections of Article 4 of
the Utah Motor V chicle Act that may be claimed to
bP in point. ( 41-1-62, 63 an<l 64 U.C.A., 1953). These
spetions <lirect what the owner and transferee shall
do upon the transfer of the vehicle. However, they are
mcffe concerne<l with the duties of the owner and
transferee at the time of the sale and with respect to
the mechanics of transfer than they are as to when
mc11r;·ship is tran.i;;ferred as bef?l'een the ow1u'r and
tmnsf el·ee. (Emphasis added) The latter is the issue
bcfo1·e the court in this case, and it is not whether
Yazzie or the Holts may have violated some statute
m· even committed a crime by reason of Yazzie's driving the vehicle around after the sale still registered
to the Holts and with their license plates on it. The
srction of Article 4 that appears to be most pertinent
as to when title or ownership passes is 41-1-72 U.C.A.,
and this or its predecessors was the section involved in the Utah cases cited above.
The court may feel that in this particular case
and for reasons of policy that it would be more desirable to reject the Jackson v. James rule as it applies to the insurance carrier. This would result in
19

State Farm's policy covering Yazzie and in a holding
that Yazzie did not become the owner either because
the registration and title were not issued to him by
the Department or were not delivered to him along
with the vehicle. The adoption of such a rule in this
case might achieve the "just" immediate result of
holding State Farm liable in this case, but it could
result in injustice in other cases and probably more
than it would prevent. That is, if a transferee, such
as Yazzie in the instant case, is not the owner, it is
well recognized that he would not have the necessary
"insurable interest" to enable him to take out a valid
automobile insurance policy on that vehicle. Stewart
v. Comme1·dal Ins. Co. of Glen Falls, N.Y., supra;
Vigo1·en v. T1'ansnational Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 96 (Sup.
Ct. of Nev. 1970).
On ocassion, a situation will occur where a seller
will cancel his automobile insurance upon the sale
and delivery of the vehicle to the buyer and the latter
will take out his own cwtomobile policy but prior to
being delivered the title and registration and certainly prior to the issuance to him of title documents by
the Department. The instant case would have been
an example of this if the Holts had either canceled
or not had insurance at the time of the sale and Yazzie had thereafter taken out a policy on the vehicle.
In such a situation and if this court holds that it is
not the parties intention that governs in determining
when one becomes an owner but rather that the statutes must be literally complied with and possession of
20

the title and registration as well as possession must
be drlivered, then there would be no coverage since
tlw buyer V{oulcl not han' the necessary insurable interrst to give rise to coverage. Suppose also the situation when' a seller sells or trades his car in to a deale1·ship, delivering possession, and taking delivery of
a 1ww 01· other car but being delayed for some period
of tinw in actually delivering possession of the title
and registration on the old one to the dPalership. A
spJlp1· who clid this, and if the District Court's ruling
in this case is affinned, would still obligate his insurance cal'l'ier for the negligence of the dealer's employees, the public 01· anyone else permissively using
the vehicle and until the selle1· had actually delivered
thesr documents of title to the dealer.
It is submitted that the best rule for this court
to adopt fm· future cases as Wf'll as this one is that
mvne1·ship for purposes of insurance coverage is to
hr r1dennine<l by the intention of the buyer and seller. If a sale has taken place as between them and possession of the vehicle plus all dominion and control
on>r it has been transferred to the buyer, then it is
mm·e
to use that as the basis for fixing responsibility on the parties to the transaction and their
insurance ca1Tiers, if any, rather than basing it on
the time title and registration are endorsed and acdeliYered to the buyer or issued by the depart111Pnt. Premiums charged the public by insurance
companies are based on the risks involved and this
is in large part determined by who controls or has
21

the right of control over the insured vehicle. It doesn't
depend on what documents of title have or have not
been transferred.
C. OTHER JURISDICTIONS \VITH SIMILAR STATUTES TO UTAH'S HAVE
HELD ON COMPARABLE FACTS THAT
THE BUYER IS THE OWNER AND NOT
A PERMISSIVE USER AND THAT BEING
THE O\VNER, COVERAGE IS NOT AFFORDED TO HIM UNDER THE OMNIBUS
CLAUSE OF THE SELLER'S POLICY.
Although no Utah case has squarely ruled upon
the precise issue involved in this case, several other
jurisdictions han". Cases which are factually similiar or almost identical to the instant case have been
decided both ways in these other jurisdictions. However, in evaluating the worth of these other cases as
precedent it is important that the statutes of that
jurisdiction be compared with the applicable ones
here 1n Utah. \Vhen this is done, it will be seen that
most of the jurisdictions which have faced these facts
and whose statutes are comparable to our own, have
concluded that a conditional vendee such as Yazzie
and under circumstances that existed here would not
be covered under the seller's policy.
United Ffre & Casualty Co. v. Perez, 419 P.2d
663 (Sup. Ct. of Colo. 1966) is closely in point to the
insant case. In the Perez case, the Edmonds had made
an oral sale of their Lincoln automobile to Reese and
had delivered possession to him. No certificate of title
was tr an sferred to Reese and the car was still regis22

ten d and titled in the Edmonds' name at the time of
thr accident in <1uestion on Non'mlx r 7 1962 and
'
'
'
in fact, the Edmonds at that timr still owed a substantial lien on the car to a financl' eompany. Prior
to i'Jm·prnber 7,
Reesp had made certain payn1ents on thP purchase price but still on that date
mYecl a $47i1 balance to the Edmonds. As of the No\'('llllH'l' 7, 1962 accidrnt, at which tinw Reese was
dri,·imi,· the Lincoln. both Rrrsr and tlw F.dnwnds had
liability insurance on thP n hidr with RePsr being
insui·ed by United Pacific and the Edmonds by Boston I nsw·anee Co1npa11y. On thrse facts, the Supreme
Conrl d Colorado held that the sole coYerage for the
;\('l'i<1ent was in United Pacific's automobilP policy
m1 Reese and that Boston Insurance Company had
110 ('n\·rragc since as bet\\'('Cn Reese and the Fdmonds,
thP intention
clca1· that the Edmonds intended
to srill :rnd Rrese intended to bu:v and r\·rn though the
t itlr 11:1d not been drliYrre<l to Reese as i·equired by a
Cl)ki':'do statutr. The Colorado Supreme Court statrd the following at 419 P.2cl pp. 66!1 and 666:
1

1

1

\Ye hold that tre policy of insurance issnc<l by Boston to Edmonds cannot he extend<•d to cm·01· the ,·cndec ( Ileese). His status was
svnonvmons with that of a conditional \'endee
and ui>on d0li,·ery of the automobile to him his
rig-ht to tlw use of the car was by virtue of his
owne1·ship <1rnl his rnwrst1·icterl rirrht to control
it, and not by Yirtnc of :i_ny rrrant of permissio to him by Edmonds. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corps. Y. Southwest Casualty Company,
D.C., 149 F. Supp. 600; Farm Bureau Mutual
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InsurancP Company of Indiana v. Edmonds,
Virginia
122 Ind. App. 440, 104 N.E. 2d
Auto Mut. Ins. Co. \'. Brillhart, 187 Va. 336,
46 S.E.2cl :377. From the case last above cited
we quote the following pertinent language.
The problem presented is one of coverage * * *. Thf' question is whether the
coverage afforded by the policy to Huffman [the conditional vendor] was extended or tr an sf erred to Owens [the vendee].
If Owens was covered or protected by the
policy, then Brillhart [a guest of Owens]
was entitled to recover of the Insurance
Company. On the other hand, if Owens
was not so protected or covered, Brillhart's
claim against the Insurance Company cannot be sustained.
* * * * *
In the case before us upon the sale of
the car Owens, the vendee, took immediate
possession of it. Huffman's possession of
it, and his right to control its use, ceased
and passed to Owens. And this was so although Huffman retained a lien on the car
for a part of the unpaid purchase price.
Aft e r the consummation of the sale,
O\\'ens' use of the car was by virtue of his
ownership of it and his right to control it,
and not by virtue of the grant of any permission to him by Huffman.
Counsel for United relv on.C.R.S. 1963,
13-6-8 which prm'ides as f oliows:
Except as provided in section 13-6-11,
no person shall sell or otherwise transfer
a motor vehicle to a purchaser or transferee thereof without delivering to such
purchaser or tr an sferee the certificat€ of
:2-t

title to such H·hielP, duh· transfrned in
thP lllall!Wr JH'l'Seribt>d ii1 SPetion la-6-9,
and, no purchasrr or transferee shall acquin' any rig-ht, titlt· or intt·rt>st in and
to a motor \·chiek· pmTk1st·d bv hilll unless and until he shall obtain· frolll the
transfrror the cert ifie a tt> of tit lP thereto
duly transfern·cl to him in
with the 1n·m·isions of this article.
This Act has lwc>11 l?l'l1stnH·d 10 makt• financial transactions i1n-oh·i1w auto111ohilrs more
scClll'l' and certain. It will
110tPcl that other
01· different types of transact ions are not made
Yoirl particularly with rcfrn•nee to the 11arties
nf Tith· Act
to the transaction. The
has only lwen inYokt>d \'»hen• tlw rights of third
partie>s arc i1ffolvcd. Littell\·. Brayton Motor
and Accrsso1·y Compnny, 70 Colo. 286, 201 P.
:34; Forney Y. .Jones, 7G Colo, :-n9. 2:-n P. 158;
.J m·grnsen ,._ Mol'l'is, 122 Colo. 9-1. 2:20 P.2d
359; First !\' ation::'-1 Bank of Ogallala, Nebraska \'. Chuck Lowen, Inc. 128 Colo. 104, 261

P.2cl lf>8.

Utah's statute ( 41-1-72 U.C.A.
states that
title is dermed not to
passed until the Department has issued a new Certificate of Registration
and Certificak of Ownership. The Colorado statute
quotcfl in the abm'e excerpt fi·om the Perez case is
P\·en m01·e mandatory and states that the purchaser
acquires no right, title or interest in the Yehicle unlrss the title has been deli\·ered to him. NeYertheless,
the Colorado court held in Perez that this language
did not preYent a transfer of ownership as between
tlw parties nor as behceen the insurance carriers for
25

f/i(' porties for 7mrposrs of dctennining coverage.

(Emphasis added)

Viyol'en v. Tnmsn((fional Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 96

(Sup. Ct. of Nev. 1970), invoked a similar problem
to the one involved in the instant case although the
holding of that case v.'as based upon a factual issue
not involved here. In the Vigoren case, Transnational
had issued its automobile policy to Doherty. Thereafter Doherty sold the car to Ferrand on a conditional sale contract although at the time of the October
16, 1966 accident in question, Doherty retained title,
remained liable to a bank for a balance on the car and
the legal registration to the vehicle remained in Doherty with the Nevada Motor Vehicle Department.
The accident occurred at a time when Ferrand's son
was driving the car and both Ferrand and his son
were uninsured, absent coverage under the Transnational policy.
The majority reversed a summary judgment
granted to Transnational holding that a factual issue
remained since Doherty asserted he had notified
Transnational's agent of the sale to Ferrand prior to
the accident and the court reasoned that if this had
occurred, that Transnational thereby would have assumed coverage of Ferrand. (There is no comparable
contention by the Holts in the instant case, and it is
undisputed that State Farm knew nothing of the sale
to Yazzie before the accident). Presumably, the Nevada Supreme Court in the Vigoren case would have
affirmed the summary judgment to Transnational
26

and would have agreed with the dissent of Justice
Zenoff in that case had this one issue not been involved. In his dissent, Justice Zenoff confronted the issue
with which we are concerned in the instant case and
stated as follows at 482 P.2d pp. 99 and 100:
2. The real problem for our determination is w11cthe1· this conditional sale was sufficiently perfected as to validly transfer ownership of the car from the sP11r1· to the buyer.
In
states fa.ilure to complete the registration l'eqniremcnts such as WP have in NRS
482AOO
482.42() ,-oids tr.e t:·nnsaction,
thus
tl1c
in the seller. Nevada's registration st:itute does not invalidate
the transaction on fri.ilm·e to complete registrci.tion reciuirements. Thr infnwtion is a misdemeanor but the sale is not affected.
Under the statutes of California, Kansas,
Missouri and Montana, ownership does not
transfer until all registration requirenwnts
are met. Somerville v. Providence 'Vashington
Indemnity Co., 32 Cal. Rptr. 378 (Cal. App.
1963) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Family Ins. Group, 429 P.2d 9!H (Kans. 1967) ;
Greer v. Zurich Insurance Companv, 441 S.W.
2rl lfi (Mo. 1969); Ostermiller v. Parker, 451
P.?d RHi 0.ifont. 1968) ( certi. den. sub nom.
Glens Falls Insnranre Co. v. Nntionwirle Mutual Ins. Co .. 394 U.S. 97f> (1969). The cited
cases naturallv relate to their statutes, which
are cle:wlv different from NRS 482.399; 'No
transfe1·
the title 01· anv interest in or to a
vehicle registered under this code shall pass
[until the certificate of title and registration
card have been properly filed].' (e.g., Cal. Vehicle Code § 5600 ; 'the sale of any vehicle re-

of

27

gistcrcd under the laws of this state, without
the assignment of such certificate of title, shall
be fraudulent and \'oid.' Kans. Stats. Annot.
( c) ( 6). See also Vernon's Mo. Stats.,
Annot.,
( 1963), and Revised
Codes of Montana, Annot. §53-109 ( d) ( 1961).
Undc1· the statutes of Colorado, Indiana
and \\' ashington, ownership transfers even
though not all registration i·equirements are
met. United Fire and Casualty Co. v. Perez,
419 P.2cl 663 (Colo. 1966); Royal Indemnity
Insurancp Co. v. Shue, 182 N.E.2d 796 (Ind.
1962); Beatty v. \Vestern Pacific Insurance
Co., 445 P.2d 325 (\Vash. 1968). The statutes
of thesr states are more similar to those of Nevada. They do not specify that a purported sale
is void or i1walicl for noncompliance with registration requirements. See Colo. Rev. Stats.,
Annot.,
13-6-9 ( 1963) ; Burns Ind.
Stats., Annot.,
( 1965) ; Rev. Code of
\Vash., Annot., 12.101 (1970), But cf. Code of
Va., Annot., §46.1-87, as construed in Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Strom, 196 S.E.2d 588
(Va. 1959).
But in Nevada the omnibus statute and
under NRS 41.460 (a), the family purpose law,
are like all others in the respect that a conditional vendee is the owner. In this case, for the
purposes of the omnibus clause, the sale of the
car by Doherty \Vas completed and his buyer
was the owner in possession.
Another case very closely in point to the instant
one is Bea.tty v. TY estern Pacific Ins. Co., 445 P.2d
325 (Sup. Ct. of \Yash. 1968). In the Beatty case,
the court, on facts materially indistinguishable from
those involved here, reversed a summary judgment
28

granted by tlw trial court decreeing con•rage in favor
oC a claimant ancl
the dt>frnclant insurance
cornpany ancl granted surnma1·y judg:nwnt for the defrnclant holding then' \vas no coverage at the time of
tlw accident.
In the Beatty case, the court stated that the first
qul'stion for its decision was "wlwther the conditional n·nclee of an auton10bilt> uses the same \vith the
'pen11ission' of an insured con<lional Y0nclor within
the contt>mplation of the usual omnibus clausP." The
court answc1·ed this nrgatiYel.v and held the comlitional n'rnlee did not haYe "])ermission." Thf' Court
tlH•n stat0d that the second question for its decision
w:ts "whethe1· 01· not a lack of strict compliance with
m11· automobile title and registration statutes changes
tlw situation ci.rnl modifies" the rule that the conditional \'endee uses the Yehicl0 as the O\Vner rather
with permission. (The vVashington statutes in
question are set out in footnotes in the court's opininll in the Beatty case and are quite similar to the
Utal1 statutes in question.) Here again, the Washington Supreme Court answered this question negati,·rly holding that lack of such compliance did not
the conditional vendee from becoming an
owrw1·. The court in Beatty did note that there had
hf'rn a departure in some jurisdictions from holding
that a conditional vendee was never a permissive user
and noted that this result had been reached where, in
violation of statute, title and registration documents
had not been transferred to the buyer along with pos29

session of the vehicle at the time of sale. However, in
discussing the effrct of these title and registration
statutes and their effect on the status of the conditional vendee, the Washington Supreme Court stated
as follows at 445 P.2d pp. 331 and 332:
This departure, however, has been in
large measure limited to those jurisdictions
which have automobile title and registration
statutes declaring void, fraudulent or ineffectual any transfer of a vehicle without a concurrent transfer of the title and registration
documents. The result of the departure is a
conclusion that the ownership of the vehicle,
with the right or power of granting or withholding permission to use, remains in the conditional vendor until such time as title and registration papers are actually transferred,
ergo, the omnibus clause in a conditional vendor's liabiilty policy is applicable during the
interval. This conclusion is generally reached
upon the theory that the particular title and
registration statutes are mandatory, and render ineffectual and unconsummated any conditional sales transaction until such time as
they are complied with. Based upon the provisions of their local statutes the following cases
have adopted or accepted this approach. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins.
Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 158, 278 P.2d 493
( 1955) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Am. Family Ins.
Group, (Kan.), supra; Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hardford Accident & Indem. Co., (Mo.), supra;
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co.,
(Mont.), supra; Turpin v. Standard Reliance
Ins. Co. (Mutual), 169 Neb. 233, 99 N.W.2d
26 (1959); Eggerdingv. Bicknell, 20 N.J. 106,
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118 A.2d 820 (
; Garlick ,.. McFarland,
Liab. Ins. Co., 344 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1965).
Howrn'l', Pven in sumc st ates which have
Uw strict type of certificate and registration
statutes pointed to in the cases just cit:'cl, the
cnurts h<we i·efuscd to permit a departure from
the general rule. United Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Pe1·ez, (Colo.) sup1·a; Rush v. Smitherman,
(Tex.) supra; Federated .Mut. Implement &
Hardware Ins. Co. , .. Rousr, 133 F.Supp. 226
(ND. Iowa 1955). And, in those jurisdictions
\Vi th decided cases where the certific[ltion and
n g-istratlon statutes HH'1·ely penalize non-compliance, rather than render a non-complying
h"l.nsridion void 01· ineffectual, the courts have
hrkl the ti·ansac tion ,··did as between the parties and applied the g·c:1cral rule whereby the
c1r·mcnts of ownership pass to tl:e conditional
v0ndee with possession of the vehicle and, under ordinary circumstances, render the insured vendor's omnibus clause inapplicable. Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Southwest Cas. Co.,
('V. D. Ark.) supra; House v. Horlges, 227
Ark. 458,299 S.\V.2fl 201 (1957); Garrett v.
Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., (Ed D. Tenn.) supra;
Hofslund v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New
York, 188 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1951).
The court in the Beatty case also considered and
rejected the argument that may be made here by the
defendants that even if title is held to have passed as
brtween the vendor and vendee, that this "should not
be held valid as against the interest of a third party"
and that the defendants in this case are in the status
of such third parties. In this regard, the court in the
Beatty case stated that a third party whose interest
was prejudiced by lack of notice in a secured com1

Sl

nw1·cial transaction was in a very different situation
than "a third party who suffered a tort." The court
pointed out that the fact that non-compliance with
these transfer and registration statutes prevented a
third party who may have been tortiously injured
from being notified of the sales transaction was of no
moment and did not give rise to a protected status.
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court in the
Beatty case rejected the claimant's argument that
the 'Vashington Financial Responsibility Act indicated a legislative intention to give third parties injured on the highways an exceptional protected status as against vendors who had not complied with the
pertinent vehicular title and registration status. The
\Vashington court noted that this act imposed responsibilities for injuries to third parties upon both the
"operator" and "owner" of a vehicle. It then noted
that the Washington statutes defined "owner" to include a conditional vendee in possession without any
additional requirement that title or resigtration must
also have been transferred or delivered. The Utah
Safety Responsibility Act ( 41-12-1 et. seq. U.C.A.,
1953) is similar to the Washington Act. The definition of "owner" in the Utah Act ( 41-12-1 (h) U.C.A.,
1953) also includes a conditional vendee in possession
regardless of what ownership documents he has received and would include Yazzie in the instant case.
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CONCLUSION
The Holts' sale of the vehicle to Yazzie occurred
some ten days before the accident in question and at
that time all dominion and control over the vehicle
passrd to Yazzie. The Holts did retain the registration and title in their names but this was only to make
sure that Yazzie paid them the full purchase price.
As between the Holts and Yazzie, it is clear that at
the tinw of the accident Yazzie owned the vehicle even
though certain documents of title had not been transferred to him.
State Farm's automobile policy issued to the
Holts had not expired at the time of the accident nor
did State Farm know anything of the sale to Yazzie.
However, it's policy only covered Yazzie at the time
of the accident if he was driving the vehicle with the
permission of the Holts. Yazzie was not driving the
vehicle with the Holts' permission since he was the
owner and did not need their permission. Under these
circumstances, Yazzie had no coverage under the
State Farm policy at the time of the accident.
The judgment of the District Court should be
rrversed and this court should enter summary judg-

ment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant.s
decreeing no coverage in Yazzie at the time of the accident.
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